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I.

INTRODUCTION

Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations
of civil marriage, a person who enters into an intimate,
exclusive union with another of the same sex is arbitrarily
deprived of membership in one of our community’s most
rewarding and cherished institutions. That exclusion is
incompatible with the constitutional principles of respect
1
for individual autonomy and equality under law.
During March and April 2001, seven same-sex couples in
Massachusetts attempted to obtain marriage licenses from their city
2
or town clerk’s office. Each couple, as required by Massachusetts
law, completed notices of intention to marry and presented these
forms, along with the required health forms and marriage license
3
fees, to a town or city clerk. In each instance, the clerk either
refused to accept the notice of intention to marry or outright
denied the license based on Massachusetts’ law that failed to
4
recognize same-sex marriage. Instead of acquiescing in the denial
of their marriage rights, the couples took legal action.
On April 11, 2001, fourteen individuals, including named
1.
2.
3.
4.

Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 949–50.
Id. at 950.
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Plaintiffs Hillary and Julie Goodridge, filed suit in Superior Court
against the Department of Public Health, stating that the
5
department’s denial of their right to marry violated state laws. Of
the seven couples, four had families with at least one child at the
6
time they filed the lawsuit.
The complaint alleged various circumstances in which the
7
absence of civil marriage has harmed the couples. For instance,
when Julie Goodridge gave birth to the couple’s daughter, her
partner Hillary had difficulty gaining access to both Julie and their
8
infant. The complaint also listed (a) the inability to obtain partner
insurance benefits and (b) limited options in providing for partner
beneficiaries in pension plans, both as harms suffered from denial
9
of the couples’ marriage rights.
The Superior Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that
10
exclusion from marriage rights violated Massachusetts law. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts granted direct appellate
review, and in its November 18, 2003 decision, held that
Massachusetts may not “deny the protections, benefits, and
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the
11
same sex who wish to marry.” After a 180-day stay of entry of
judgment, same-sex marriage became legal in Massachusetts on
12
May 17, 2004. This landmark day in achieving equality for gay
and lesbian citizens prompted a debate over what many believe to
5. Id. at 949.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 950 n.6.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., id.
10. Id. at 951. Plaintiffs alleged violation of the laws of the Commonwealth,
including rights guaranteed under articles 1, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 16, and Part II, c. 1,
§1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 950. Two provisions which
seem particularly applicable to the plaintiffs’ claim are outlined in Article 1 and
Article 10. Article 1 states, “[a]ll people are born free and equal and have certain
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties . . . that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness.” MASS. CONST. art. I, amended by MASS.
CONST. amend. CVI. Article 1 further states, “[e]quality under the law shall not be
denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin.” Id.
Article 10 states, “[e]ach individual of the society has a right to be protected by it
in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws.”
MASS. CONST. art. X.
11. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948.
12. Fran Fifis & Rose Arce, Same-sex Couples Exchange Vows in Massachusetts,
CNN.COM (May 17, 2004), at http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/
mass.samesex.marriage/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
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be the last great civil rights battle in United States history.
As newspapers and television stations broadcasted stories of
gay and lesbian weddings in Massachusetts, another movement was
taking place across the nation. In an effort to prevent similar court
rulings, over thirty-five states introduced legislation defining
14
marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Of these states,
thirty-one proposed amendments to their state constitutions
banning marriage or its legal equivalent between same-sex
15
couples. Minnesota is one of these states.
On March 4, 2004, a bill for an act proposing an amendment
to the Minnesota Constitution defining marriage as between one
man and one woman was read for the first time in the state House
16
of Representatives. On March 24, 2004, the bill passed in the
17
House by a vote of 88 to 42. On March 25, 2004, the Minnesota
18
Senate received the bill from the House of Representatives. The
Senate, however, adjourned on May 14, 2004 without voting on the

13. See Alan Maass, Who’s Standing in the Way of Gay Marriage? SOCIALIST
WORKER ONLINE (Mar. 19, 2004), at http://www.socialistworker.org/20041/491/49105BackofBus.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
14. Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG
(Oct. 6, 2004, updated Nov. 3, 2004), at http://www.stateline.org/live/
ViewPage.action?siteNodeId=136&languageId=1&contentId=15576 (last visited
Mar. 16, 2005).
15. Id. Eleven states voted to adopt anti-same-sex marriage amendments into
their state constitutions in the November, 2004 general election. Mississippi,
Montana and Oregon specified only the definition of marriage, limiting it to
unions of one man and one woman. Id. The amendments in Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma and Utah go one step
further by prohibiting civil unions and other partnership benefits. Id. Currently,
eighteen states have adopted anti-same-sex marriage amendments. Michael Foust,
Marriage Amendment Passes Easily in Kansas, 70–30 Percent; Pro-Amendment Church
Survives Pre-Election Arson Attempt, P.B. NEWS (Apr. 6, 2005), at
http://www.baptistpress.org/bpnews.asp?ID=20530 (last visited Apr. 9, 2005).
16. Journal of the House, 83d Leg., 4900 (Minn. Mar. 4, 2004) available at
http://ww3.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2003-04/J0304070.htm#4900
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005). The 2004 version of the proposed amendment would
have added a section to Article XIII of Minnesota’s Constitution, reading in part,
“[o]nly the union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in Minnesota. Any other relationship shall not be recognized as a
marriage or its legal equivalent.” H.F. 2798, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).
17. Journal of the House, 83d Leg., 5635 (Minn. Mar. 24, 2004) available at
http://ww3.house.leg.state.mn.us/cco/journals/2003-04/J0324078.htm#5656
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
18. Journal of the Senate, 83d Leg., 4900 (Minn. Mar.25, 2004) available at
http://www.senate.leg.state.mn.us/journals/2003-2004/32504079.pdf#Page95
(last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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19

matter.
On January 6, 2005, just two days after the start of the 84th
Legislative Session, the marriage amendment bill was once again
20
introduced in the Minnesota House of Representatives.
The
21
House passed the bill on March 31, 2005. The Minnesota Senate
received the bill on April 4 and referred it to the Judiciary
22
Committee.
On April 7, 2005 a motion to place the bill on
23
General Orders was made but did not prevail. Currently, the bill
24
is in the Minnesota Senate Judiciary Committee.
Minnesotans
appear divided on the issue. In a February 2004 poll by Minnesota
Public Radio and the St. Paul Pioneer Press, forty-nine percent of
respondents opposed a state constitutional amendment defining
marriage as between one man and one woman, while forty-three
25
percent favored such an amendment.
This note examines the constitutionality of Minnesota’s
proposed marriage amendment.
The note begins with a
description of the recent national events leading up to the
amendment’s proposal, followed by a discussion of the history of
marriage in Minnesota, including passage of the Defense of
26
Marriage Act in May 1997. Next, the note examines the language
of Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment and briefly
27
addresses the process of amending state constitutional provisions.
It then analyzes the proposed amendment’s constitutionality under
19. See supra note 14.
20. H.F. 0006, S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) at
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php
?b=House&f=HF006&ssn=0&y=2005 (last visited Mar. 30, 2005).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Tom Scheck, Poll: Most Minnesotans Opposed to Gay Marriage, MINNESOTA
PUBLIC RADIO, (Feb. 5, 2004), at http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/
2004/02/05_scheckt_gaymarriagepoll/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2005). The poll
included 625 voters, with a margin for error of plus or minus four percentage
points. Id.
26. See infra Part II; Patricia Lopez Baden, Gay Marriage Ban Passes Easily
Despite Spear’s Plea, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 17, 1997, at 1B. Although
arguments exist which call into question the constitutionality of state defense of
marriage laws, this article discusses the constitutionality of the United States
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) as the grounds for DOMA’s unconstitutionality
also pertain to state defense of marriage laws and to the article’s overall objective
in concluding that Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment is
unconstitutional. See infra Parts IV.D–E.
27. See infra Part III.
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the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
28
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Finally, the note discusses Congress’s proposal of a Marriage
Protection Act and the implications this would have on federal
29
courts’ ability to review same-sex marriage controversies.
II. A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE INEQUALITY: PROTECTING THE STATUS
QUO
A. Preserving Racial Integrity
The history of marriage is replete with discrimination. As of
1949, thirty states maintained legislation outlawing interracial
30
marriages.
The purpose of anti-miscegenation laws was,
according to one court, “to preserve the racial integrity of its
31
citizens,” so as not to create “a mongrel breed of citizens.”
Another court opined:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And
but for the interference with his arrangement there would
be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the
32
races to mix.
It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional under the Due
33
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Despite
Loving v. Virginia, many of these laws remained written into state
provisions until quite recently. It was not until 2000 that the last
remaining state, Alabama, repealed its constitutional ban on

28. See infra Parts IV–VI.
29. See infra Part VII.
30. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44, 62 (Haw. 1993). Minnesota was not one of the thirty states to enact legislation
prohibiting interracial marriage. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5.
31. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). Miscegenation is defined as
“[a] marriage between persons of different races.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 811
(7th ed. 2000).
32. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial judge). This lower court’s holding
was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 12.
33. Id. The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, which upheld Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law based on its
1955 ruling in Naim. Id. at 7. See also supra text accompanying note 28.
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34

B. The Scope of Loving: Minnesota Addresses the Issue of Same-Sex
Marriage Rights
In 1971, Minnesota rejected an application of Loving that
35
would compel same-sex marriage rights. The appellants in Baker
v. Nelson, Richard Baker and James McConnell, argued that state
statutes authorized same-sex marriage, and that additionally, the
36
United States Constitution required state authorization.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the first contention by citing
statutory language indicating that the drafters intended marriage
to be between persons of the opposite sex, and by referencing non37
legal and legal definitions of marriage.
The court further concluded that the state’s authorization of
only certain classes to marry does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating, “[t]here is no
irrational or invidious discrimination . . . . [T]here is a clear
distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race
38
and one based upon the fundamental difference in sex.” The
court failed to outline, however, what this “clear distinction” was.
While the court recognized that marriage is a “fundamental
freedom,” and found denial of marriage based on racial
classification “directly subversive of the principle of equality” and
“sure[] to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due
process of law,” it never explained how or why denying same-sex
marriage does not deprive gay and lesbian citizens of liberty and
39
equality. For reasons explained throughout the remainder of this
note, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling in Baker should no
longer be viewed as correct, if it ever was.

34. See ALA. CONST. amend. 667 (2000) (repealing amendment 102 which
stated that “the legislature shall never pass any law to authorize or legalize any
marriage between any white person and a negro, or descendant of a negro.”).
35. Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 314–15, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (1971).
36. Id. at 310, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
37. Id. at 311–12, 191 N.W.2d at 185–86. The court quoted Webster’s
International Dictionary, which defines marriage as “the state of being united to a
person of the opposite sex as husband or wife,” and Black’s Law Dictionary, which
reads in part that “[m]arriage . . . is the civil status, condition, or relation of one
man and one woman united in law for life . . .” Id. at 186 n.1.
38. Id. at 313–15, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
39. Id. at 314, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
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C. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Since Baker, other state courts, including Hawaii and Vermont,
have done much to afford same-sex couples the right to marriage
40
or its equivalent.
In response to the Hawaii court decision,
Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
41
Likewise, the Hawaii
became law on September 21, 1996.
legislature took measures to prevent same-sex marriages before the
42
court’s ruling took effect. In Vermont, however, the legislature
upheld a decision of that state’s highest court by legalizing same43
sex civil unions.
40. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 59 (Haw. 1993) (holding that Hawaii law
restricting marriage to a male and a female denies same-sex couples access to
marital status and its rights and benefits, thus “implicating the equal protection
clause of [the Hawaii Constitution].”). Interestingly, the Hawaii court also held
that there is no fundamental constitutional right to same-sex marriage. Id. at 57.
Yet, the court went on to cite the Hawaii Constitution that, “[n]o person shall . . .
be denied the equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the
person’s civil rights or be discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of
race, religion, sex, or ancestry.” Id. at 60. The court referenced the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition of “civil rights” as synonymous with “civil liberties.” Id.
(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (6th ed. 1990)). Because civil liberties are
“[p]ersonal, natural rights guaranteed and protected by the Constitution,” the
court held that these could not be taken away on the bases of race, religion, sex or
ancestry without also violating the right to equal protection of Hawaii’s laws. Id.;
see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that same-sex couples
are entitled under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution to
the benefits and protections available to opposite-sex couples). The Common
Benefits Clause reads in part, “government is, or ought to be, instituted for the
common benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation or community;
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, family or
set of men, who are a part only of that community . . . .” VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VI,
amended by VT. CONST. ch. II, § 76). The amendment did not alter the meaning of
the constitutional provision, but substituted “person” and “persons” for “man” and
“men.” Id. The court left it to the legislature to establish an appropriate means
for fulfilling this constitutional mandate. Baker, 744 A.2d at 886.
41. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). DOMA enables states to
disregard same-sex marriages validly performed in other states, and defines
marriage as between one man and one woman. Id.
42. See Evan Wolfson, Silver Lining in Disappointing End for Hawaii Case,
LAMBDA LEGAL (Feb. 1, 2000), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=597 (last visited Feb. 22, 2005). A 1998
amendment to the Hawaii Constitution removed the same-sex marriage issue from
the ambit of Hawaii’s equal protection clause, thereby ending any chance that
Baehr might legalize same-sex marriages in Hawaii. Id.
43. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201, 1202 (2004). Civil unions entitle
partners of the same-sex to “receive the benefits and protections” afforded to
spouses, and also require that same-sex couples “be subject to the responsibilities
of spouses.” Id.
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Many states, including Minnesota, have passed legislation
echoing DOMA, defining marriage as between one man and one
woman, prohibiting same-sex marriage and recognition of same-sex
44
marriages performed in other states or foreign jurisdictions. In
light of the recent Massachusetts decision in Goodridge v. Department
45
of Public Health legalizing same-sex marriage, Minnesota has taken
action in an attempt to prevent its supreme court from similarly
ruling that Minnesota’s anti-same-sex marriage laws are
unconstitutional. The result of this action has culminated in a
proposal to amend the Minnesota State Constitution.
III. MINNESOTA’S PROPOSED MARRIAGE AMENDMENT
A. The Language of the Amendment
The proposed marriage amendment has two sections. The
first section, entitled “Constitutional Amendment Proposed,” states,
[a]n amendment to the Minnesota Constitution is
proposed to the people. If the amendment is adopted, a
section shall be added to article XIII, to read: Sec. 13.
Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in Minnesota. Any other
relationship shall not be recognized as a marriage or its
legal equivalent by the state or any of its political
46
subdivisions.
Section 2 outlines the question to be submitted to voters,
which reads, “Shall the Minnesota Constitution be amended to
provide that the state and its political subdivisions shall recognize
marriage or its legal equivalent as limited to only the union of one
47
man and one woman?”
44. MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (2004). Minnesota
Statutes section 517.01 reads in part, “[m]arriage, so far as its validity in law is
concerned, is a civil contract between a man and a woman . . . . Lawful marriage
may be contracted only between persons of the opposite sex . . . .” MINN. STAT. §
517.01. Section 517.03 was amended to prohibit “a marriage between persons of
the same sex,” and states, “[a] marriage entered into by persons of the same sex,
either under common law or statute, that is recognized by another state or foreign
jurisdiction is void in this state and contractual rights granted by virtue of the
marriage or its termination are unenforceable in this state.” MINN. STAT. § 517.03
(1997).
45. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
46. H.F. 006, S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
47. Id. The amendment in its 2004 form proposed submission to the people
of Minnesota in the 2004 general election. H.F. 2798, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
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B. The Amendment Process
1.

Passing the Amendment

The Minnesota Constitution may be amended in one of two
ways. First, a majority of persons elected to each house of the
legislature may propose a constitutional amendment. Once a
proposed amendment has passed through both the House of
Representatives and the Senate, it is submitted to state electors at a
48
general election for their approval or rejection. Amendments will
only be added to the Constitution if a majority of electors votes to
49
ratify the amendment.
The Minnesota Constitution may also be amended through a
Constitutional Convention. This process requires that two-thirds of
persons elected to each house of the legislature approve
submission to electors at a general election the question of whether
50
to call a convention to revise the Constitution. If a majority of
electors vote for a convention, the legislature will call a convention
51
at its next session. Once the convention has revised the proposal,
the revision is submitted to the people at the next general
52
election.
Three-fifths of voters on the issue must ratify the
53
revision to adopt the language as a new Minnesota Constitution.
State supreme courts have the authority to conduct postamendment review to ensure that amendment procedures adhere
54
to state constitutional requirements. Courts may not, however,
2004). The current version proposes submission to Minnesotans at the 2006
general election. H.F. 006, S.F. 1691, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005).
48. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Constitutional amendments are published with
session laws. Id.
49. Id. A majority of electors voting in the election, and not just a majority
who vote on the amendment provision, must approve the amendment in order for
it to be added to the Constitution. Id.
50. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
51. Id. Conventions must be composed of the same number of members as
there are in the house of representatives, and must be chosen in the same manner
as members of the house of representatives are chosen. Id. The delegates must
convene within three months following their appointment to the convention. Id.
52. MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 3. The general election must be held at least 90
days after submission of the revised Constitution. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Graham v. Jones, 3 So.2d 761, 767 (La. 1941) (stating, “the judicial
department of the government invariably has the right to consider whether the
legislative department and its agencies have observed constitutional requirements
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judge the wisdom of an amendment or consider whether it
55
Therefore, once adopted, the
conflicts with existing state law.
Minnesota Supreme Court may only invalidate an amendment if it
finds that the amendment process in some way violated
constitutional requirements.
2.

The Last Word: Supreme Law of the Land

For a state constitutional provision to be enforceable, it must
56
not contravene the United States Constitution.
When
determining whether an amendment violates the Constitution,
every reasonable presumption must be entertained in favor of the
57
amendment’s validity.
It is only in the most extreme circumstances that a supreme
58
court will invalidate a state constitutional amendment. Unless a
in attempting to amend the Constitution and may set aside their acts in case they
have not done so.”); New Mexico ex rel. Clark v. State Canvassing Board, 888 P.2d
458, 460 (N.M. 1995) (concluding that a proposed state constitutional
amendment, despite its approval by voters, was an unconstitutional violation of the
procedural requirements for amending New Mexico’s Constitution).
55. Duggan v. Beermann, 544 N.W.2d 68, 75 (Neb. 1996); see also Omaha
National Bank v. Spire, 389 N.W.2d 269, 278 (Neb. 1986) (“‘conflict’ with existing
articles or sections of the Constitution can afford no logical basis for invalidating
an initiative proposal. . . . When a newly adopted amendment does conflict with
preexisting constitutional provisions the new amendment necessarily supersedes
the previous provision.” (quoting Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let’s Help
Florida, 363 So.2d 337, 341–42 (Fla. 1978)). Nor may courts interfere with the
amendment process before the adoption of new provisions on the basis that such
provisions are unconstitutional. Grose v. Firestone, 422 So.2d 303, 306 (Fla.
1982); State ex rel. Slemmer v. Brown, 295 N.E.2d 434, 435–36 (Ohio Ct. App.
1973).
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance there of; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Id. See
also Gray v. Golden, 89 So.2d 785, 790 (Fla. 1956) (holding that states “have a right
to change, abrogate or modify [state constitutional provisions] in any manner they
see fit so long as they [k]eep within the confines of the Federal Constitution.”); In
re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 612 A.2d 1, 15 (R.I. 1992) (stating that the
right to amend state Constitutions is only checked by limits imposed by the U.S.
Constitution).
57. See e.g., Smith v. Bd. of Supervisors of Des Moines County, 320 N.W.2d
589, 592 (Iowa 1982); Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 449 A.2d 1144, 1146–47
(Md. 1982); Opinion of the Justices, 261 A.2d 250, 254 (Me. 1970); Opinion of the
Justices, 430 A.2d 188, 190 (N.H. 1981); Southern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 497 S.W.2d
891, 895 (Tenn. 1973).
58. See State ex rel. Rhodes v. Brown, 296 N.E.2d 538, 540 (Ohio 1973).
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constitutional amendment is “plainly and palpably” invalid, it
59
should be upheld. An amendment that takes away or contradicts
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution meets these
60
criteria.
Thus, while state constitutions may expand federal
constitutional rights, if ever a state constitutional provision takes
away rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, the
Federal Constitution will supersede state law and reign as the
61
“Supreme Law of the Land.”
IV. THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
A. History
Even before the adoption of the United States Constitution,
the values underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause were already
apparent in United States history. The Articles of Confederation,
agreed to by Congress on November 15, 1777 and ratified by the
states on March 1, 1781, contained a clause stating, “Full faith and
credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts and
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other
62
state.” Inclusion of this provision in the Articles of Confederation,
which upheld considerably looser relations among states, indicates
the importance of such a provision to the endurance of a successful
63
Union.
When the framers of the United States Constitution first
proposed the language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
wording of the clause differed from the wording later adopted into
64
the Constitution.
As originally proposed, the Full Faith and

59. See e.g. Barnhart v. Herseth, 222 N.W.2d 131, 136 (S.D. 1974) (quoting
State ex rel. Adams v. Herried, 72 N.W.93, 97 (S.D. 1897)).
60. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (stating that state
laws which conflict with federal law are without effect); In re Rourke v. N.Y. Dept.
of Corr. Servs., 603 N.Y.S.2d 647, 650 (N.Y. 1993) (asserting that while states may
supplement federal constitutional guarantees, they may not circumscribe them);
Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Crapitto, 907 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tex. 1995)
(holding that state constitutions cannot subtract from rights guaranteed by the
United States Constitution).
61. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
62. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV (U.S. 1781).
63. ANASTAPLO, GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 168 (1989).
64. See James M. Patten, The Defense of Marriage Act: How Congress Said “No” to
Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 939, 946–47
(1998).
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Credit Clause read,
Full Faith and Credit ought to be given in each state to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every
other state; and the legislature shall, by general laws,
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and
proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect which
65
judgments obtained in one state shall have in another.
However, upon proposal by James Madison, the language was
later changed to substitute “shall” for “ought to” and “may” for
66
“shall”. The result of this shift in language created a document
that unambiguously demanded each state to recognize public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings performed in any other state of
the Union. Further, such recognition is so absolute that the
framers deemed total control by the legislature to prescribe the
manner in which this provision be enacted unnecessary; instead,
the legislature is left with the ability, but not the unequivocal duty,
to ordain the manner in which states are to grant full faith and
67
credit to the acts, records, and proceedings of all other states.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as adopted into the United
States Constitution of 1787, states,
Full faith and credit shall be given, in each state, to the
public acts, records, and judicial proceedings, of every
other state. And the Congress may, by general laws,
prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and
68
proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect thereof.
As one commentator stated in interpreting the meaning
behind this Clause,
[a] motive of a higher kind must naturally have directed
[the framers] to the provision. It must have been, “to
form a more perfect union,” and to give to each State a
higher security and confidence in the others, by
attributing a superior sanctity and conclusiveness to the
69
public acts and judicial proceedings of all.
Not only did the framers provide for faith and credit to the
65. MEIGS, WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 256 (1987) (emphasis added).
66. Id.
67. See Patten, supra note 64, at 947.
68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
69. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: WITH PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE
COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION, 190 (1994).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 10
SCHLICHTING

1662

4/25/2005 1:42:06 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:4

acts, records and judicial proceedings of each state, they gave them
full faith and credit, leaving them with “positive and absolute verity,
so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them be denied
70
. . . .” The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as adopted, leaves no
question but that full faith and credit be given to acts, records, and
judicial proceedings of each and every state.
B. The Effects Clause: Limits on Congressional Power
The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
known as the Effects Clause. The object of this sentence is “to
introduce uniformity in the rules of proof,” regulating not which
acts, records, and judicial proceedings are to be given full faith and
71
credit, but the manner in which proof of these are to be presented.
Any other interpretation would be “wholly senseless” because it
would give Congress the power to nullify the purpose under which
72
the Full Faith and Credit Clause was adopted.
Therefore,
although the Effects Clause grants Congress the power to dictate
the manner in which full faith and credit is to be afforded, the
Constitution also limits this power by mandating absolute full faith
and credit to the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each
state.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
1. Full Faith and Credit to Public Acts, Statutes, and State
Constitutions
Courts have frequently reiterated the importance of lending
73
full faith and credit to laws and rulings of sister states. Courts
have also upheld the extension of full faith and credit to public acts
74
within the legislative jurisdiction of an enacting state. Further,
70. Id. at 191.
71. Id. at 192.
72. Id. at 193.
73. See Newman v. Worcester Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. (In re L.C.), 659 N.E.2d
593, 602 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (granting full faith and credit to a Maryland court
ruling removing a child from custody of an Indiana family); LeBlanc v. United
Eng’s & Constructors, Inc., 584 A.2d 675, 677–78 (Me. 1991) (stating that Maine
could only exercise jurisdiction where awards were previously granted in another
state if the exercise of jurisdiction did not reflect hostility toward the laws of a
sister state or threaten the system of cooperative federalism).
74. See Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 30 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Ill. 1940).
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the United States Supreme Court has stated that statutes are public
75
acts within the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Finally, courts afford state Constitutions full faith and credit
according to the same standards that mandate full faith and credit
76
of public acts, records, and judicial proceedings.
2.

Conflict of Laws Generally

Courts have addressed conflicts arising from policy differences
between states’ laws. In Hirson v. United Stores Corp., the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that local policy “may
not over-ride the constitutional requirement of full faith and
77
credit.” In contrast, federal courts have held that there is room
for some negotiation concerning conflicting state policies in the
78
effect and operation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. This
79
“room” for negotiation, however, is narrow. While the Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute another
80
state’s conflicting laws for its own, it does compel states “to
recognize and respect rights acquired by private individuals under
the laws of other states, though such laws may differ from its own
81
and vary from its policy.”
3.

Conflict of Laws Regarding Marriage

The general rule regarding conflicts between states’ laws
concerning marriage is that the law of the state in which the
marriage is contracted or celebrated determines the validity of a
82
However, there is one exception to this rule. If
marriage.
75. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 411 (1955); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 183 (1936); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 644;
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1932).
76. See People v. Zuccaro, 108 N.Y.S.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. 1951).
77. Hirson v. United Stores Corp., 34 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942).
78. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273–74 (1935); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Acc. Com'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Broderick, 294 U.S. at
642.
79. Broderick, 294 U.S. at 642; Hannah v. Gen. Motors Corp., 969 F. Supp. 554,
557 (1996).
80. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); Durham v. Ark.
Dept. of Human Servs., 912 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Ark. 1995).
81. Roller v. Murray, 76 S.E. 172, 175 (W.Va. 1912).
82. Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703, 704–05 (2nd Cir. 1950); Rogers
v. Sullivan, 795 F. Supp. 761, 764 (E.D.N.C. 1992); In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316
P.2d 1106, 1107 (Ariz. 1957); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn.
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recognition of a marriage performed outside a forum state is
contrary to the public policy of the forum, such marriage may be
83
deemed invalid.
To date, marriages that were valid where
performed have been invalidated only in violation of “a strong
policy of the state where at least one of the spouses was domiciled
at the time of the marriage and where both made their home
84
immediately thereafter.”
Until now, court precedent disallows for full faith and credit to
marriages based only on limited and specific policy concerns.
Acceptable policy concerns historically have been limited to
protecting individuals who are parties to the marriages and to
85
upholding formalized marriage procedures. This limitation also
includes non-recognition of a marriage where a previous marriage
has not yet ended, where one of the parties is of minority age,
where one party to the marriage was mentally incompetent, where
the marriage was incestuous, or where the marriage union was
86
established by common law.
1961); Fisher v. Toombs County Nursing Home, 479 S.E.2d 180, 182–83 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996); Ma v. Ma, 483 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Laikola
v. Engineered Concrete, 277 N.W.2d 653, 655–56 (Minn. 1979).
83. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500, 503–04 (3rd Cir. 1961)
(applying the law of the party’s domicile at the time an alleged common law
marriage took place, thereby invalidating the marriage, despite its validity in the
state where it took place); In re Mortenson’s Estate, 316 P.2d at 1108 (holding
invalid a marriage between first cousins who were residents of and intended to live
within Arizona, even though the marriage was valid in the state in which it was
contracted); Catalano, 170 A.2d at 728 (invalidating a marriage legally performed
in Italy between a Connecticut resident and his niece); Beddow v. Beddow, 257
S.W.2d 45, 48 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953) (invalidating a marriage performed outside of
Kentucky between Kentucky residents, one of whom had been adjudged insane
prior to the marriage).
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT : CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 cmt. j.
(1971).
85. Robert L. Cordell II, Same-Sex Marriage: The Fundamental Right of Marriage
and an Examination of Conflict of Laws and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 26 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 247, 267–68 (1994).
86. Id. at 267. For decisions invalidating marriage when a previous marriage
had not ended, see Parker v. Parker, 270 A.2d 94, 96 (Conn. 1970); K v. K, 393
N.Y.S.2d 534, 535 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977); Bolinski v. Bolinski, 122 N.Y.S.2d 16, 19
(N.Y. City Ct. 1953). In Wilkins v. Zelichowski, the court held that a marriage
performed and valid in Indiana was void in New Jersey because the wife’s minority
at the time of the marriage violated New Jersey’s public policy. 140 A.2d 65, 69
(N.J. 1958); see also Cunningham v. Cunningham, 99 N.E. 845, 848 (N.Y. 1912)
(holding that a marriage valid in New Jersey between an adult husband and a wife
not of legal age to consent was invalid in New York because it was repugnant to
New York’s public policy). Marriages performed when one party was mentally
incompetent have also been denied full faith and credit based on policy reasons.
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Court precedent does not justify denial of same-sex marriage
rights, since denying recognition of such marriages is intended
neither to protect same-sex individuals nor to uphold formalized
marriage procedures. On the contrary, denying full faith and
credit to same-sex marriages damages same-sex couples’ rights by
removing protections afforded to them in the forum state as soon
as they leave the confines of that state. Further, this denial
undermines the importance of formalized marriage procedures,
which courts have continually emphasized, because it fails to hold
all United States citizens to the same societal standard in legalizing
their relationships.
D. Defense of Marriage Act: A Clear Violation of Full Faith and Credit
Although the focus of this article is on Minnesota’s proposed
constitutional amendment regarding marriage, it is worth noting
87
that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) is also a
violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
88
Constitution. The Act grants states the latitude to deny full faith
and credit to same-sex marriages performed under the laws of
another state, as well as the latitude to deny recognition of any
89
right or claim arising from such marriages. The Effects Clause of
the United States Constitution, however, prohibits this type of
90
amendment.
In enacting DOMA, Congress overstepped its
constitutional authority by regulating which acts deserve full faith
and credit. In doing so, Congress perverted the language of the
Constitution, which grants Congress only the limited power to
create laws to carry out the constitutional guarantee of full faith
and credit, but not the power to regulate when or if states may
See First Nat’l Bank v. N.D. Workmen’s Comp. Bureau, 68 N.W.2d 661, 664 (N.D.
1955) (holding that marriages between persons of unsound mind are voidable).
Frequently, courts also rule that states need not recognize the validity of
incestuous marriages performed legally outside the forum state. See In re Estate of
May, 114 N.E.2d 4, 6 (N.Y. 1953). Finally, common law marriages, although valid
in the state in which they were performed, have been invalidated by courts on the
grounds that they violate a states’ public policy. See Stein v. Stein, 641 S.W.2d 856,
857–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982). But see Netecke v. State ex. rel Dept. of Transp. and
Dev., 715 So.2d 449, 450 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (extending full faith and credit to
common law marriages performed in other states while failing to discuss possible
policy exceptions). See also cases cited supra note 80.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
88. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C.
90. See infra Part. IV.B (discussing the Effects Clause).
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apply full faith and credit. Furthermore, DOMA bypasses case
precedent concerning a justifiable policy rationale for denying full
91
faith and credit to marriage relationships.
E. Unconstitutionality of Minnesota’s Proposed Constitutional
Amendment
Although the language of Minnesota’s proposed marriage
amendment does not explicitly proscribe recognition of marriage
92
As such, the
laws of other states, this effect is inevitable.
amendment will violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
United States Constitution. The Minnesota legislature has no
93
power under the Effects Clause of the United States Constitution.
Further, although state case precedent falls short of binding the
legislature, the legislature has disregarded court-related history
regarding acceptable policy justifications for non-recognition of
94
marriage laws of other states.
If the legislature enacts the
marriage amendment, Minnesota courts will likely strike down the
amendment because no case precedent supports a justifiable policy
95
reason for failing to recognizing same-sex marriage. Therefore,
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution, the proposed Minnesota marriage amendment is
unconstitutional.
V. FEDERAL DUE PROCESS
A. Marriage Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
91. See infra Parts IV.B and C.3; see also Cordell, supra note 85, at 264–71
(elaborating on the unconstitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act).
92. The language, “[o]nly the union of one man and one woman shall be
valid or recognized as marriage,” is not limited in its scope to merely denying
same-sex couples Minnesota marriage licenses, but will also lead to the
invalidation and non-recognition of same-sex marriages legally performed in other
states.
See H.F. 006, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2005) available at
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=H0006.0&session=ls84
(last visited Mar. 16, 2005).
93. See infra Part IV.B.
94. See supra Part IV.C.3.
95. See infra Part IV.C.3. Based on case precedent, there are no viable policy
arguments for non-recognition of same-sex marriages. Non-recognition is aimed
neither at protecting an individual who is a party to the marriage nor upholding
formalized marriage procedures. See infra Part IV.C.3.
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reads in part, “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty,
96
A state
or property, without due process of law . . . .”
constitutional amendment prohibiting a specific class of individuals
from the right to marry is a denial of liberty under the Due Process
97
Clause.
Because such an amendment violates a federally
protected right, the United States Constitution supersedes the
98
states’ ability to deny marriage to same-sex couples.
B. Marriage as a Fundamental Right
Although history abounds with instances of marriage
discrimination, it also establishes an undisputable basis for
classifying marriage as a fundamental right. As far back as the late
1800s, courts recognized the importance of the institution of
99
marriage. In 1888, the United States Supreme Court stated that
100
marriage creates “the most important relation in life” and “is the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would
101
be neither civilization nor progress.”
The United States Supreme Court has since continued to
regard marriage as a central part of American life. In Meyer v.
Nebraska, the Court asserted that the right “to marry, establish a
home and bring up children” is “essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men,” and is a vital aspect of liberty protected by
102
the Due Process Clause. Again, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court
defined marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of man,”
103
fundamental to our very existence.
In Loving v. Virginia, the United States Supreme Court
eliminated racial marriage discrimination and upheld its previous
decisions stating that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States
104
Constitution.
In Zablocki v. Redhail, the U.S. Supreme Court
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
97. See infra Part V.B.
98. See supra Part III.B.2.
99. See, e.g., Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 211.
102. 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
103. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
104. 388 U.S. at 12. In Loving, the Supreme Court reiterated the conviction set
forth in Skinner that marriage is a fundamental right. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). The
Court held that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men . . . .
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again stated that “the right to marry is part of the fundamental
105
‘right of privacy’ implicit in the Fourteenth [Amendment].” The
right to marry is thus a federally pronounced, fundamental right.
C. Marriage as a Right of Privacy
Not only has the United States Supreme Court classified
marriage as a fundamental right, but it has also held that the
marriage relationship lies “within the zone of privacy” created by
106
the Constitution. Although the text of the Constitution grants no
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that one
aspect of liberty afforded constitutional protection under the Due
107
Process Clause is the right of privacy.
The link between marriage rights, the right to privacy, and the
Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of “liberty” becomes even
more important in view of the United States Supreme Court’s
108
decision in Lawrence v. Texas.
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court
counseled “against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the
meaning of [a personal] relationship or to set its boundaries absent
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of
the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to
deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law.” Id. The court
went on to say that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious . . . discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person . . . resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” Id.
105. 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978). Since Loving and Zablocki, federal courts have
continued to uphold marriage as a civil right. See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 304 (1990); Perez-Oropeza v. I.N.S., 56
F.3d 43, 45 (9th Cir. 1995); Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 763, 739
(9th Cir. 1986); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1336 (10th Cir. 1981); Bradbury v.
Wainwright, 538 F. Supp. 377, 378 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
106. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). The Court stated in part:
[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights — older
than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and
intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes
a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a
bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Id. at 486. Subsequent cases have emphasized the Supreme Court’s unequivocal
respect for the right to privacy in the marriage relationship. See Zablocki, 434 U.S.
at 384–86; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
107. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
108. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.”
The Court emphasized that persons are entitled to respect for their
private lives, and that the right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives individuals the full right to engage in private sexual
110
acts without intervention of the government.
While Lawrence centralizes its holding on individual liberty to
engage in private sexual conduct, the holding is important because
marriage rights also fall within the zone of privacy impliedly
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
111
Amendment. Lawrence notes that the right to privacy protects not
only “sexual acts,” but also recognizes the importance of the
112
relationship between persons engaging in sexual acts.
Because
Lawrence holds that the right to liberty entitles persons to respect
for their private lives, free from state laws that violate human
dignity, and because the Supreme Court has held that marriage is a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution, the Due Process
Clause should also protect marriage rights for same-sex couples.
D. Standard of Review Concerning Fundamental Rights
“Critical examination” of state interests is required when such
interests interfere with a fundamental right, such as the right to
113
marry. Rigorous scrutiny is not required for state regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into marital
114
relationships.
However, when state regulations interfere directly
and substantially with the right to marry, strict scrutiny is
115
required.
In Zablocki, the Court held that because a Wisconsin statute
absolutely excluded a specific class of persons from marriage, the
statute did not have a minimal impact and therefore required
116
evaluation based on strict scrutiny.
The Court concluded that
109. Id. at 567.
110. Id.
111. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86.
112. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. The Court stated that “[w]hen sexuality
finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this
choice.” Id.
113. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).
114. Id. at 386–87.
115. See id.
116. Id. at 387–88. The statute barred any persons from marriage who were
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“[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is
supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely
117
tailored to effectuate only those interests.” The Court stated that
“even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute’s
requirements suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of
choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be
118
fundamental.”
Despite legitimate and substantial state interests,
the Supreme Court did not sustain the Wisconsin statute in Zablocki
because the means by which the state chose to achieve those
119
interests unnecessarily impinged on the right to marry.
The proposed marriage amendment to the Minnesota
Constitution likewise prevents an entire class of persons from
120
access to marriage rights.
Therefore, should its constitutionality
come into question, the amendment would properly be evaluated
based on strict scrutiny.
E. Proposed Marriage Amendment a Violation of Due Process
If Minnesota’s proposed marriage amendment makes its way
through both houses of the legislature and the people of
Minnesota adopt it, the amendment will inevitably end up before
the courts, which will have the power to conclude that it violates
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause of the United
121
States Constitution. Precedent establishes not only that marriage
is a fundamental right but also secures marriage as a “right of
122
privacy” protected under the constitutional guarantee of liberty.
The Supreme Court also declared sexual intimacy and sexual acts
123
Just as the
as rights to liberty under the Due Process Clause.
Court has protected rights of sexual intimacy between same-sex
couples, it should also protect same-sex marriage as a right of
behind in child-support payments or whose children were likely to become public
charges. Id. at 375.
117. Id. at 388.
118. Id. at 387.
119. Id. at 388.
120. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003)
(referring to same-sex couples as “an entire, sizeable class . . . who have absolutely
no access to civil marriage and its protection because they are forbidden from
procuring a marriage license”).
121. See supra Part III.B (describing the state amendment process).
122. See supra Parts V.B–C.
123. See supra text accompanying note 107.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss4/10

22

Schlichting: Note: Minnesota’s Proposed Same-sex Marriage Amendment: A Flaming
SCHLICHTING

2005]

4/25/2005 1:42:06 PM

PROPOSED SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AMENDMENT

1671

privacy protected by the constitutional guarantee of liberty under
due process. A strict scrutiny evaluation of the amendment
124
requires its nullification.
As the United States Supreme Court
once stated, “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
125
Should questions regarding the
mandate our own moral code.”
validity of the marriage amendment arrive before the Supreme
Court, Minnesotans can be hopeful that the Court will extend the
Constitutional guarantee of due process to same-sex couples by
striking down the amendment, once again upholding the principle
of liberty as it did in Lawrence.
VI. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Does Equal Protection for Gender Extend to Same-Sex Marriages?
The Equal Protection Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
126
the laws.”
This guarantee prohibits discrimination based on
127
sex. For a valid equal protection claim, the law must in some way
128
The argument that denial of same-sex
classify an individual.
marriage rights violates equal protection centers on the fact that a
person who wishes to marry someone of the same sex is prohibited
from doing so based solely on his or her gender classification. This
gender classification thereby leads to gender discrimination, which
presumptively leads to a violation of equal protection.

124. Sufficiently important state interests do not support the amendment,
although states might assert an important interest in regulating marriage laws. See
supra Part V.D. Even so, case precedent justifies such regulation only if its aim is
to protect individuals who are a party to the marriage or to uphold formalized
marriage procedures. See supra Part IV.C.3. Since regulation of same-sex marriage
rights furthers neither one of these interests, there is no precedent establishing it
as a viable state interest. Further, the impact of the proposed amendment would
not affect only the state’s interest to regulate marriage, but would also affect the
right of individuals to marry, which courts have long recognized as a fundamental
right. See supra Parts V.B and D.
125. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
127. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971); Lindsey v. Shalmy, 29
F.3d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that female employees have a right
under the Equal Protection Clause to be free from gender discrimination in the
workplace).
128. Phelps v. Phelps, 446 S.E.2d 17, 20 (N.C. 1994) (citing Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391 (1978)) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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B. Equal Application of a Classification
If it is to withstand constitutional challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause, a gender classification must be supported by an
important governmental objective and must substantially relate to
129
achievement of that objective.
Proponents of the proposed
marriage amendment may argue that the amendment is not a
violation of equal protection based on gender, since the
amendment would apply equally to men and women.
In
countering this argument, it is important to examine the Court’s
130
ruling in Loving v. Virginia. In Loving, the plaintiffs challenged a
Virginia law that, in part, automatically voided any marriages
between Caucasian and African American persons without any
131
judicial proceedings. The state argued that since the law applied
equally to both races, the statute, despite its reliance on racial
classifications, did “not constitute an invidious discrimination based
132
upon race.”
The state’s position in Loving closely parallels the potential
argument for the marriage amendment. The Court in Loving,
however, rejected the State’s reasoning and held that mere equal
application of a statute containing racial classifications did not
remove the classifications from protection under the Fourteenth
133
Amendment.
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding, mere
equal application of denial of marriage rights based on gender
classifications is not enough to remove such classifications from
constitutional protection.
However, there is one major difference between the racial
discrimination in Loving and the gender discrimination arising
from the marriage amendment. In Loving, the purpose of the laws
prohibiting interracial marriages was to preserve the integrity of
the white race, as opposed to preserving the integrity of the races in
134
general.
The proposed marriage amendment may not create a
similar imbalance between men and women.
Despite this
129. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co.,
446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
130. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 8.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11 & n.11. The Court does not address this contention, concluding
that such discussion is unnecessary because the classifications themselves are
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 11 n.11.
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difference, if one focuses on the Court’s holding that equal
application does not remove a racial classification from
constitutional protection, there remains a vital parallel to gender
classifications in the marriage amendment situation.
C. Equal Protection as Applied to Same-Sex Marriage
In Baehr v. Lewin, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
state statute limiting marriage to a man and a woman would be
deemed unconstitutional unless the defendant was able to prove
135
Prior to
that the statute met strict scrutiny requirements.
remanding the case, the Hawaii Supreme Court referenced Loving,
stating that if the word “sex” were substituted for the word “race,”
and “Article I, Section 5” for “the Fourteenth Amendment,” it
would yield “the precise case before us together with the
136
conclusion that we have reached.” On remand, the circuit court
concluded that the sex-based classification in the state’s marriage
statute is an unconstitutional violation of the state’s equal
137
protection clause.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not name specific
suspect classifications, courts have consistently held that sex is a
138
quasi-suspect class protected under the amendment.
This fact,
coupled with Baehr’s extension of Loving to same-sex marriage
rights, lends strong support to the argument that denial of samesex marriage rights violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
Minnesota’s proposed marriage
amendment, which both on its face and through its application
would deny recognition of same-sex marriages, is a violation of the
135. 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993).
136. Id. at 68. The result of these substitutions would read, “[W]e reject the
notion that the mere 'equal application' of a statute containing [sex] classifications
is enough to remove the classifications from [Article I, Section 5’s] proscription of
all invidious [sex] discriminations . . . . In the case at bar . . . we deal with statutes
containing [sex] classifications, and the fact of equal application does not
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which [Article I,
Section 5] has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to [sex].”
Loving, 388 U.S. at 8–9.
137. Baehr v. Miike, CIV No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 1996), aff’d, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997).
Article I of the Hawaii
Constitution states in part, “[n]o person shall . . . be denied the equal protection
of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person’s civil rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or
ancestry.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5.
138. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.
VII. FURTHER COMPLICATIONS: THE MARRIAGE PROTECTION ACT
A. Does Congress Have the Authority to Strip all Federal Courts of
Jurisdiction to Hear Cases?
On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives passed a bill
139
entitled the Marriage Protection Act (MPA).
Proponents of this
bill intend that, by denying federal courts jurisdiction to hear
constitutional challenges to both DOMA and the MPA, the bill will
prevent federal courts from requiring states to recognize same-sex
140
marriages performed in other states. Currently, the 2005 version
of the MPA is in the U.S. House of Representatives and has been
141
referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
Article III of the United States Constitution states that, “[t]he
Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
142
made, or which shall be made, under their authority” and that
the “supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to
Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
143
the Congress shall make.”
In Ex parte McCardle, the Supreme
Court held that under Article III, Congress has the authority to
stipulate exceptions to and regulations of its appellate
144
jurisdiction.
Proponents of the MPA would argue that based on
Ex parte McCardle, Congress has the authority to deny federal
139. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
140. See Vikram David Amar, The Marriage Protection Act Bill Passed by the House of
Representatives: Trying to Make Sense of the Nonsensical, FINDLAW’S LEGAL COMMENTARY
(Aug. 6, 2004), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20040806.html. The bill
states, “[n]o court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question
pertaining to the interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of,
section 1738C of this section.” H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004). The 2005 version
of the MPA is identical to the 2004 version. H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005).
141. Bill Summary for the 109th Congress, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR01100:@@@X.
142. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
143. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
144. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868). In this case, Congress did not completely limit
federal courts’ appellate power to hear cases of habeas corpus. Rather, Congress’s
adoption of the Act of 1868 limited only appeals from circuit courts. The Act did
not exclude federal jurisdiction over habeas cases in courts other than circuit court
appeals. 74 U.S. at 514–15.
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jurisdiction of cases under DOMA and the MPA. However, one
problem with this contention is that the MPA would strip all federal
courts of all jurisdiction to hear such cases.
In his article, law professor and legal scholar Vikram David
Amar asserts that
[b]ecause Article III says federal jurisdiction “shall”
extend to “all” such cases, it strongly implies – and many
scholars have concluded – that there must be some
federal court open to hear any case arising under a
federal law, which would include MPA and DOMA cases.
That means that, even if Congress has broad powers to
strip the jurisdiction of lower federal courts or the
145
Supreme Court, it cannot do both at once.
Thus, one rebuttal to the validity of the MPA is that it violates
Article III by removing all federal jurisdiction over DOMA and
146
MPA cases.
B. Impact if MPA is Deemed Constitutional
Even if courts determine that the MPA is constitutional, it is
not likely to prevent federal courts from ruling on same-sex
marriage issues.
Same-sex couples who would seek federal
jurisdiction over a case concerning their marriage rights could still
allege violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and
Equal Protection Clause, and of the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
147
Federal courts would thus have jurisdiction to hear
Article IV.
such cases, since they do not involve review of either DOMA or the
MPA. Ironically, it is the opponents of same-sex marriage, and not
same-sex couples, who would attempt to invoke interpretation of
DOMA to bolster their argument that states need not recognize
145. Amar, supra note 140.
146. Another legal commentator has questioned the validity of the Marriage
Protection Act based on constitutional separation of powers principles. See Joanna
Grossman, The Proposed Marriage Protection Act: Why it May be Unconstitutional,
FINDLAW’S
LEGAL
COMMENTARY
(July
27,
2004),
available
at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20040727.html. “[J]urisdiction-stripping
takes power from the Courts, and leaves it with Congress” or with state legislatures.
Id. This creates an imbalance between the legislative and judicial branches,
because it enables the controlling party in Congress to pass laws stripping courts of
the right to review certain laws whenever Congress does not approve of how courts
are handling those issues. Id. The ability of Congress to so act may undermine
the general constitutional allocation of power among the branches of government.
See id.
147. See supra Parts IV.C–E, V.E.
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148

same-sex marriages performed in other states.
Federal courts
would not have jurisdiction to hear defenses based on DOMA, but
would still be able to review federal constitutional challenges to
state marriage amendments.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Nearly one year has passed since the first legal same-sex
marriage license was granted.
As Julie Goodridge herself
commented, the sun still rose on May 18th, 2004, Massachusetts did
not erupt into flames, and no heterosexual couples fell apart simply
149
because same-sex couples got married.
Instead, because of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruling, some people are now just “a
150
The Minnesota Marriage Amendment has
little more equal.”
risen for the second time in the legislature. If it succeeds in the
Senate, and if Minnesotans adopt it into their Constitution, we
must look to the judiciary to uphold the values of the United States
Constitution in striking down the amendment.
As Baehr states, sometimes constitutional law mandates, against
the will of the majority, “that customs change with an evolving
151
social order.”
The proposed marriage amendment violates the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Due Process Clause of the
152
Strong arguments exist that it also
United States Constitution.
153
violates the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.
Even if Congress passes the Marriage Protection Act, it is likely that
federal courts will be able to exercise jurisdiction to address the
154
constitutional issues raised by state marriage amendments.
In
conclusion, if federal courts truly uphold the “constitutional
principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under
155
law,” then they must invalidate state amendments barring samesex marriages and mandate equal access to marriage rights for
same-sex couples.

148. Amar, supra note 140.
149. Julie Goodridge, Keynote Address at the Minneapolis National ComingOut Day Luncheon (October 15, 2004).
150. Id.
151. 852 P.2d at 63.
152. See supra Parts VI , V.
153. See supra Part VI.
154. See supra Part VII.B
155. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003).
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